without also having some strong motivation or purpose. I shall call this question of my title the self-model question.
The self-model question has been implicitly asked and implicitly answered at every human time and place. For it is embedded in the very idea of a culture or society. Family, clan or community, status, role, gender, race, topography, myth, tradition, religion-all these and much more have been and continue to be ubiquitous instruments for telling people what to make of themselves. "Who are you and where do you come from?" is the stock Homeric question to a male stranger, and it is standardly answered in terms of name, lineage, and native place. The self-model question takes on a quite different register when it is asked explicitly and critically. In Plato's dialogue Phaedrus Socrates does this by way of explaining why he has no time to waste on the interpretation of myths: I can't as yet know myself, as the inscription at Delphi enjoins; and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me ridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters. Consequently I ... direct my inquiries ... rather to myself, to discover whether I am a more convoluted beast and more steamed up than Typhon, or a gentler and simpler creature, whose natural allotment is something divine and unsteamed up.2
Socrates is not inquiring into his local identity as an Athenian citizen, but asking what to make of himself innately or by nature, as the human being that he is. The word nature (physis) marks his inquiry as a philosophical quest: What is it to be
human, with the implication: What will a true answer to that question tell me about how I should live my life? "Know yourself" was the famous Delphic injunction, but this text is one of the earliest places where that commandment is explicitly enrolled in the service of philosophy. By tradition it had meant "know your limits" or "know that you are not a god." Socrates, in striking contrast, interprets the Delphic precept as an invitation to ask an extraordinary disjunctive question: Is it my nature to be bestial and violent or godlike and peaceable?
The classical Greek world or mentality was full of gods. Nothing is harder than this for us moderns to grasp when we visit that world. The difficulty is not primarily one of engaging with the complexities of polytheism and alien rituals. Rather, it is a difficulty that arises out of the radical differences and inconsistencies attaching to the gods according to speaker and context. Typhon, though bestial in form and attributes, was divine. So when Socrates positions himself between Typhon and "a divine and peaceable nature," he is advancing his own and not a standard paradigm of divinity as such. The unqualified benevolence of god(s), as proposed by Plato, was an outlandish thesis in its day, a thesis that he constantly urges against the lies of popular mythology; but there was no inquisition or sacred text or thought police to check Plato from uttering it. 3 The relevance of this to my theme is twofold: first, when Greek philosophers began to ask the self-model question, they were pushing at an open door by comparison with societies such as those in medieval and Renaissance Europe where Chris-tianity had settled the main details. Second, radical fluidity in the concept and connotations of the divine provided the philosophers with the opportunity to formulate theologies that turned divine attributes into human ideals and terms of selfdefinition, or to say it better, projected human ideals and terms of self-definition onto the divine. Hence Plato's extraordinary answer to the self-model question in several of his dialogues: "Make yourself as like as possible to God."4 When ancient Stoics looked to their philosophy as the only foundation of real freedom, the rationale for what they were doing had a great deal to do with this Platonic recommendation.5 In other words, the Stoic's outlook rested on a self-model that was as much theological as it was psychological. Speaking broadly, we can say that the leading ancient philosophers, notwithstanding their numerous differences, answered Socrates' question by proposing that we have it in us to aspire to divinity (whatever that precisely means) at one extreme and to become bestial at the other. We are taken to be composite creatures, embodied souls or minds, and what we make of ourselves depends crucially on how we negotiate this complex structure. The body, so the theory goes, gets its life from our souls, and since our souls give us our identity as sentient and purposive beings, whatever is good or bad for our souls is better or worse than anything that merely benefits or harms our bodies.
II
Let us step back for a moment from these Greek thoughts about gods and souls and bodies and remind ourselves of how very ancient they are. We can find an English word-for-word translation of them, but a translation is not a genealogy. In my opening paragraph I described our relation to Greek philosophy by the familiar metaphor of "cultural roots," but I am far from wedded to it. Roots generate predictable crops, but what we cull from the Greeks constantly shifts according to our perceptions, interests, and prejudices. I prefer the model of a house, fashioned out of "crooked timber" (to borrow Isaiah Berlin's arresting phrase) and containing hundreds of rooms and levels and passages with extensions and demolitions occurring regularly and randomly.6 We so-called Westerners have taken over a huge wing of this house, which we tinker with constantly; but we also have the run of numerous distant rooms, including the classical room, some of them totally begrimed and neglected and others less so. We visit these rooms from time to time, picking up bits and pieces that take our fancy, and sometimes we try to take them back to our own part of the house. But that's a long distance, and on the way those ancient artifacts become so bespattered with the dust from nearer rooms and corridors that we have a devil of a job (if we are historians) to see them for what they once were. So we tend to fit them into our regular cupboards instead of dusting them off, scrutinizing them, and building a special cabinet for them.
So it is, I want to suggest, with our appropriation of ancient self-models. We all have some feel for ideas like Stoic freedom and autonomy, or for Socrates' positioning himself between the bestial and the divine. But that feel is almost impossible to detach from all the subsequent incrustations that alienate us from ancient Greecemonotheism or agnosticism, human rights, social welfare, technology, antibiotics, body transplants, and so forth. There are, though, ways of trying to engage such detachment, however imperfectly. In this paper I will approach the self-model question as something that is itself so heavily incrusted by Greek culture that it needs a genealogical approach in order for its historical significance to be grasped. How did Plato come to pose the terms of Socrates' self-model question? What was psychologically, ethically, and socially at stake? "In doubt to deem himself a god, or beast," as Alexander Pope in his Essay on Man echoed Plato, two thousand years later. I called Socrates' self-model question disjunctive, but in spite of its either/or form, the question is also rhetorical and wildly optimistic, for it entertains the possibility that human nature includes, or can aspire to, what is objectively best in the world. As I have remarked, the connotations and particularities of Greek divinity could vary greatly according to context, but as a generalizing verbal sign, theos (god) connoted extraordinary power, authority, status, beauty, bliss, and immortality. In addition, the Olympian gods as a collective, and Zeus in particular, were traditionally believed to sanction certain ethical rules and to be angered by human breaches of these. When Plato makes Socrates wonder if his nature includes a divine portion, a contemporary reader would be challenged to ask what selection of divine attributes could be humanly applicable, especially with "gentle and peaceable" as Socrates' gloss on the divine nature; for in numerous preceding texts or contexts that nature had been construed as anything but well disposed in its relation to persons.
Plato, notoriously, advanced elaborate arguments attempting to prove the immortality of the human soul. If their conclusion were sound, it would follow that human beings are like gods in respect to the very attribute that had traditionally been the strongest marker of difference between them. From Homer onward (and no doubt for centuries earlier) Greek gods are "the deathless ones" (athanatoi) and human beings are "mortals" (brotoi or thnetoi): these terms virtually function as proper names, markers of generic identity and difference. Plato was not the first Greek thinker to challenge this radical distinction between the divine and the human, only the most illustrious and thorough.7 Actually, as an item in answering the self-model question, literal or personal immortality turned out to be too much for Aristotle, or for Stoics and Epicureans, to attribute to humans. But this limitation did not inhibit them from treating godlike activity or likeness to god (however these are to be understood) as the highest goal that human beings should aspire to in their embodied here and now, if they are to make the most of themselves.
Did the prephilosophical tradition offer them any prototype for these audacious proposals? Yes and no. Homeric heroes, both Achaeans and Trojans, are fre-quently called "godlike." This term marks them out from the mass of people, calling attention to their resplendent beauty and prowess. When the philosophers appropriate the idea of "likeness to god," they trade heavily on this pair of properties, beauty and prowess (arete), which were also signified in the Athenian male status ideal of being kalos kai agathos.8 But the philosophers' linguistic conservatism actually accentuates their conceptual innovations in at least two respects. First, the beauty and prowess that they propose as aspirations and potentialities become qualities of the mind and character, strictly and entirely. Second, these qualities and the likeness to god that they involve are presumed to be available in principle to everyone with the aptitude and determination to shape themselves accordingly; these things are not contingent gifts to a few socially privileged individuals, but projects or goals built into human nature as such.
The philosophers' goal of happiness is an equally striking instance of linguistic conservatism combined with conceptual innovation. Human flourishing had been traditionally linked to divine support, hence the standard word for happy, eudaimon, which brings both ideas together. The word literally means "divinely favored," but because divine favor was so hard to assure and predict, happiness was tantamount to good luck. For even though there were acknowledged ways of trying to please this goddess and avoid displeasing that god, Greek myths and Greek experience constantly underlined the precariousness of happiness as conceived in terms of material prosperity. This outlook is brilliantly captured by the historian Herodotus when he imagines the Athenian Solon warning Croesus, the fabulously rich and complacent King of Lydia, to heed the following answer to the self-model question: "The human being is entirely sumphora"-which one could translate weakly by "a creature of chance" but more tellingly by "a disaster," because Croesus would soon find Solon's words validated by his own total ruin.9 If long-term happiness was to be a real and reasonable human aspiration, it had to be redefined with corresponding revision not only to people's theologies but also to their self-models.
The decisive step, as usual, was taken by Plato. What he proposed, in brief, was that we shall be divinely favored and therefore capable of achieving eudaimonia if we submit ourselves to the rule of reason: reason can function for us as our "internal divinity" ( Timaeus 90a-c), making our lives safe for long-term happiness and excellence. The expression "rule of reason" slips easily over the tongue. Like "enslavement to passion" (another innovative Platonic metaphor), it is one of those dusty items from our cultural house that we have put in our own cupboard without close scrutiny. Focus on the words "rule" and "enslavement," and you are transported back to the world of Athenian politics-except that Plato's politics is psychological. He politicizes the mind, to express the previously unimagined idea of selfgovernment-an idea that divides each of us into a natural ruler, reason, and a set of natural subjects, our drives and appetites. Upset the proper hierarchy, and we become like an anarchic state, tyrannized by our passions.
This psychological model has become so hackneyed and contentious that it To show how much turns on these questions, I need only select from claims that subsequent Greek philosophers made under Plato's influence. For Aristotle, our intellect is "something divine"-our most powerful and precious possessionand the basis for a "contemplative" life that is both quintessentially human and yet more than merely human."1 The understanding of nature and values possessed by an expert Epicurean hedonist equips one to "live like a god" and to be happy even on the rack.12 The Stoic Epictetus tells his students that they are never alone because they have a divinity within them, vested in their rationality: his project, as teacher, is to help them to so identify with this divinity that they become like god, or even become gods.13
These are not the remarks of wild spiritualists or magicians. The philosophers who voice them are hardheaded reasoners who value empirical evidence, proof, and clarity. They are committed to advancing practicable recipes for human happiness, recipes that put this goal securely, or at least maximally, in our individual power. But the grandiosity of their project becomes especially clear when we recognize that it amounts to the denial that any human life has to be tragic. That denial flies smack in the face of a literary tradition that had generated unsurpassed representations of tragic suffering. What is Achilles to make of himself when he discovers that his angry withdrawal from the Achaean host has brought about the death of Patroclus? What is Medea to make of herself when she discovers Jason's perfidy? What is Oedipus to make of himself when he discovers that he has committed incest and parricide? We all identify with these questions and the wondrous pathos by which they are voiced; we do not find them obscured by the cultural dust of suc- Logos in Greek is a notoriously multivalent and even contested term. It often signifies meaningful speech, but it is derived from a verb that includes the following among its most basic senses: collect, select, recount, and account. Logos became the standard Greek word for speech because all discourse involves such activities as collecting, accounting, explaining, and so forth. Apart from talking then, logos ac-quired all the connotations we today associate with thinking. This, though, was a gradual but momentous process-nothing less than the evolution of rationality, both as an explicit concept and as an explicit marker of the difference between human faculties and the features of other animals.20 In the earliest Greek philosophers (before Plato) we can actually observe this evolution taking place, and in none of them more seminally than Heraclitus. That remarkable thinker speaks by hint and paradox rather than discursively, but his notorious obscurity does not extend to the following crucial points. 21 Heraclitus pioneered the notion that nature is a law-governed system, a system of regular changes that conform to determinate measures and proportions. He advances an account or logos of this system, but the system and his account of it are two aspects of the same thing. He accounts in words for the logos or formula that is nature. We may say, to make Heraclitus comprehensible to our modern selves, that he gives a rational account of a rationally structured world. But, as I said before, "rational" slips very easily over our scientifically educated tongue. Heraclitus cannot appeal to explicit concepts of rationality; for there are none at this date. What he does have available to him are such concepts as structure, measure, proportion, balance, rhythm, ratio. His logos is all of these, and because it is all of these it comprises a great deal that we associate with rationality. However, Heraclitus is not defining rationality, but discovering it, and helping himself to it via the best term available to him-logos. In addition, he associates the logos with divinity. Heraclitus's divinity governs the world by governing itself according to determinate measures and proportions. This is the first clear example in Greek of cosmic and divine rationality.
What we have here is an amazing set of ideas that will be enormously potent both for the future of ancient philosophy and also for all the cultures that it has influenced. First, the connection between the human faculty of logos and the physical universe as an orderly system; second, the selection of balance, order, and proportion as markers of rationality; third-and this is what I was primarily looking for-the linkage between the rule of reason and divinity. In Heraclitus's philosophy, logos is both a global force and a mental power. His protophysics is also protopsychology. Heraclitus, anticipating Plato's Socrates, says: "I went in search of [or inquired into] myself."22 The cosmic order that he discovered-a universe governed by divine logos-offered itself as a startlingly new paradigm for what to make of oneself: a microcosm of psychological balance, self-measurement, internal control, and beauty.
Scholars of ancient philosophy have begun to recognize that the so-called Presocratics, long regarded as mainly protophysicists, were as absorbed by the selfmodel question as they were by cosmology.23 Rationality's godlike capacity to govern the self is a thought that took root as a consequence of the idea that the world itself is a cosmos, an orderly structure governed by a superhuman and therefore divine mind.
Yet, outside the heady air of pre-Socratic science it was obvious that logos often spoke with the voice of Typhon, Socrates' steamed-up beast. We are not yet in a culture accustomed to hearing that human beings or divinity have a rational faculty as such. The sophist Gorgias, Plato's elder contemporary, agreed that logos is a great power, capable of producing "the most divine products." But what Gorgias means by these products are the effects of persuasive speech on a malleable audience. 24 In the analysis of logos, which Gorgias offered in defence of Helen's adultery with Paris, human beings are so susceptible to the charms of eloquence that they can be persuaded into anything. By contrast with Plato's deeply structured self-model (which is still on the horizon), Gorgias trades on the notion that we are essentially passive and pliable recipients of words, especially words that work on our passions and make us feel good.
Gorgias was a brilliant exponent of the psychology assumed by every courtier, media operative, or crowd pleaser. The self-model he attributes to the recipients of logos is one that lacks any framework or internal structure or autonomy. Listeners, he implies, cannot take charge of anything, least of all their own happiness, because they have nothing to take charge with. They are ruled by external logos, that is, words imposed upon them; they have no internal guardianship, consisting of their own logos; no rationality. They are, in sum, as powerless to resist the contemporary demagogue as the archaic Greeks had been to resist their arbitrary gods. Is this a tongue-in-cheek story laced with pro-Hellenic propaganda? Maybe. But it rings completely true as an illustration of the completely volatile and pliable self-a self that can make nothing of itself because it lacks any structure or capacity to go in a direction different from the way someone else's words persuade it to go. Gorgias must have loved Herodotus's account of Xerxes' manipulation. How did Plato react to Gorgias?
Herodotus offers us an extraordinary illustration of this kind of self-model, or rather non-self-model, in his account of how Xerxes decided (if that is

IV
We know, because Plato wrote a dialogue called Gorgias. There Plato contrasts the freedom and excellence of a self-scrutinizing soul, ruled by reason, with enslavement to political rhetoric and lust for political power. As before, we need to recognize the startling novelty of these ideas in this context. Through a series of oppositions-soul versus body, mental health versus bodily health, proof versus persuasion, truth versus illusion-Plato generates the constituents of a selfmodel premised on the thesis that personal happiness, justice, affection, and community all depend on internal balance and order. Long before Plato, the Greeks had a word, sophrosyne, literally "safe-thinking," which they mainly used to express compliance with external authority. Sophrosyne is often translated by self-control. But that translation anticipates the very idea that Plato in the Gorgias was probably the first to formulate explicitly-the difficult idea of conceptualizing the self in terms of a ruling principle (reason) and a set of otherwise unruly parts. 26 We saw how Heraclitus pioneered the concepts of cosmology and rationality. Plato draws on that legacy in the Gorgias dialogue in order to press his claims for the supreme value of internal balance and self-regulation. To Callicles, an ambitious believer in the natural right of the strong to dominate the weak, Plato's Socrates says:
Wise people say that heaven and earth, and gods and humans, are held together by community, affection, order, sophrosyne, and justice; that is why they call this universe a kosmos [a beautiful structure], and not disorder or intemperance. (508a)
Socrates follows this striking observation on the harmony of nature, with a still more arresting statement: "You haven't noticed, Callicles, that geometrical proportionality (isotes) is very powerful among gods and humans; your idea that you have to try to grab more for yourself is due to your neglect of-geometry": hardly the failing we attribute to our lawmakers. In the context of the Gorgias, neglect ofgeome- It should be evident from what I have been saying that rationality's power, or the rule of reason, was a supremely normative concept for Plato and his successors and, moreover, a concept of that which is absolutely good per se. As such, it was taken to be supremely desirable and therefore capable of motivating the will. David Hume famously objected that reason "is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."27 For Hume, our volitions are entirely grounded in our passions or impulses, and reasoning is demoted to a purely instrumental and subservient role. Plato by contrast, at the beginning of the philosophical tradition, viewed reason as that part of the self that is best and quintessentially human, and is endowed with its own unique desires and pleasures. 28 Cosmic balance and beauty, mathematics, body/soul dualism, medicine and politics as sources of metaphors for mental health, authority and subordination, aspiration to a quasi-divine identity-all of these are scattered around in that distant room of our cultural house, contributors to the genealogy of self-control, internal freedom, personal integrity, making the best of oneself. Modern ideals of (re)distributive justice, egalitarianism, and social welfare have heavily implicated government in our basic conceptions of the external determinants of a happy life. And so today, we-at least we in Berkeley-think that it is the job of laws and state institutions to do a great deal to protect people not only from injustice but also from economic and social and environmental tragedy. To quite an extent, our "Western" world has converted ancient philosophy's ideal of internal autonomy and balance and freedom, and also moral mathematics and the rule of divine reason, into the would-be fair apparatus of a free and mutually beneficial social system. As long as that goes reasonably well, it seems to undercut the rationale of a philosophy like Stoicism. Of course, this apparatus often fails, or it holds, but you are still left groping on your own. Then the self-model question has to be faced. Ancient philosophy tries to persuade us that those who look to reason and excellence of character as the foundation of their identity and freedom and social relationships are never bereft of the fundamental ingredients of happiness. If we find this far too much or far too little, is it because we think long-term happiness is too subjective and impenetrable to be secured by any theory, or because we think it primarily depends on the way the world treats us, or is it because we have not been faced with the sinister knock at the door in the middle of the night and had to make something of ourselves in the violation of home and person? I leave these as questions for my readers to ponder.
Appendix: Happiness in Greek Ethics
My main purpose in writing this paper was to address a gap, as I find it to be, in our modern understanding of Graeco-Roman ethics and its psychological and theological underpinnings. Long before philosophy, the Greeks, like all peoples, had strong ideas about human excellence and such virtues as courage, intelligence, and justice. What starts with Socrates and Plato is the remarkable proposal that if you have such virtues, you have all or most of what you need in order to achieve long-term happiness (eudaimonia), even under quite unfavorable conditions of body or material goods. It is the tie between virtue and happiness that clamors for analysis and justification.
Modern scholars have done much to clarify this eudaimonistic perspective.34 Even so, there is a reluctance to acknowledge that when the ancient philosophers claim that their specification of the best human life constitutes eudaimonia, they could really be talking about happiness in anything like its modern usage, such as a fully satisfying life from one's subjective perspective.35 Certainly, they are not talking about transient moods and intermittently pleasurable sensations; so some scholars prefer to translate eudaimonia by "well-being" because the standard "goal" of ancient ethics involves one's life (-time) as a whole.36 Nonetheless, there is copious evidence that what the ancient philosophers mean by eudaimonia is happiness, and not a condition that can be captured by a less demanding English expression. 37 The gap that I have tried to address concerns the extraordinary boldness from the pre-philosophical or indeed from any perspective of making long-term happiness a rational disposition as distinct from a condition controlled by fortune, temperament, and external conditions. We have no difficulty, perhaps, in understanding why virtues should be construed as rational dispositions, but why should they and rationality itself be thought to condition happiness? The answers I have suggested trade heavily on the idea that the human capacity to reason and to impose structure and balance on one's life struck the ancient philosophers as an amazing discovery and power, a godlike endowment as it were. Hence happiness or a flourishing life could be thought to be a project that was in one's own control, should one choose to be ruled by one's own rational capacity.
Thanks to Foucault's brilliant work in his book The Care of the Self, the notion that Graeco-Roman ethics was premised on self-cultivation has acquired general currency.38 While there is much to applaud in his lively account of the ascetical Ancient Philosophy's Hardest Question: What to Make of Oneself? exercises associated with this goal, I think that Foucault was too inclined to assimilate them to early Christian attitudes and deontological injunctions, as when he writes: "It is the anxiety concerning all the disturbances of the body and the mind, which must be prevented by means of an austere regimen; it is the importance attributed to self-respect ... that is exercised by depriving oneself of pleasure" (Care of the Self, 41). There is no entry for "happiness" or eudaimonia in the index of his book, and Foucault rather plays down the tranquillity and even "joy" that many ancient philosophers take their ethical prescriptions to promise. 39 
Notes
